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him since 1922. The lots were located on Wolff Street just off
West Colfax Avenue in Denver. They were zoned Residence "B".
Relator failed of permission before the Inspector, Board of Adjustment and District Court.
The sole question prosecuted to the Supreme Court was whether
the evidence entitled relator to the relief demanded. No protests
or objections to the petition had been made. The Court found nothing in the return of respondents which even remotely suggested
that the contemplated use of relator's property would be injurious
or detrimental to adjacent properties. It recognized the principle
that any regulation or restriction upon the use of property which
bears no relation to public safety, health, morals or general welfare, cannot be sustained as a proper exercise of the police power
of the municipality. The Court found the surrounding area to be
commercial in nature and concluded that the Board's action was
arbitrary and directed issuance of the permit.

AGENCY, CONTRACTS, CORPORATIONS AND
PARTNERSHIPS
By ERVIN T. LARSON of the OrdwaL Bar
AGENCY

(1) Gray v. Blake, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 4.
Action by real estate broker Gray against the defendant Blake
for commission in obtaining a purchaser for certain real estate.
Trial by jury was in favor of defendant and plaintiff sued out
writ of error. Blake and his wife were owners in joint tenancy
of ranch property. Blake alone listed the property with Gray in
1949 and again in 1950. In March, 1951, Gray obtained a prospective buyer for the property upon terms which were approved by
Blake. A down payment of $1,000 by the purchaser was made
by check but the check was never cashed. Abstracts were furnished
and examined, after which the purchaser tendered the balance of
the purchase price in cash and demanded a deed signed by both
Mr. and Mrs. Blake. Mrs. Blake refused to sign, the deal fell
through and Gray sued for his commission.
Held: That if the broker Gray knew in advance that Mrs.
Blake would not join in the conveyance the broker could not recover a commission. The opinion also indicates that if the broker
knew of the existence of the joint tenancy at the time of the listing,
it would be incumbent upon him to obtain the wife's consent to the
listing as well as the husband's. The case was reversed for failure
of the trial court to instruct properly and the cause was remanded
for further proceedings.
(2) Dumont v. Teets as Director of Employment Security,
1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 4.
Plaintiff, Dumont Sales Company, a partnership, brought
action against Bernard E. Teets as Director of the State Depart-
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ment of Employment Security, seeking a declaratory judgment to
the effect that certain of their agents were individual contractors
and not employees and therefore the company was relieved from
making contribution under the Colorado Employment Security
Act.
The stipulated facts were that the Dumont Company was engaged in selling maintenance equipment and janitorial supplies
and had several agents who had applied for permission to sell the
company's products. Some of the agents were assigned certain territories, others had no particular territory. They used their own
automobiles and paid all of their own expenses. They remitted the
full price for all orders directly to the company and were paid
direct commissions by the company. There were no restrictions of
any kind as to the amount of time to be devoted to the sale of the
company's products by these agents and many of them sold several
other lines as well as the Dumont Company products. Also, some
of the agents devoted only a small part of their time to selling the
Dumont Company's products. The agency agreement was subject
to termination by either party at any time and agents were not
required to sell any particular amount of the products or to re-z
frain from engaging in other occupations.
The trial court held the agents to be employees and entered
judgment in favor of the Department of Employment Security.
On writ of error to the Supreme Court, the Court held that since
the word "employee" is not defined in the Colorado Employment
Security Act it retained its ordinary and customary meaning, the
true test being the right of control retained by the employer. In
the instant case, no particular services were required and no time
limit fixed and therefore the agents were definitely classified as individual contractors. The ruling of the trial court was therefore
reversed.
(3) Lambert v. Haskins, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
This is probably the most important case in this category during the present year, since it is one of first impression in Colorado.
The defendant Lambert by written listing employed the plaintiff Haskins as sole and exclusive agent to sell or exchange his farm
at an agreed price and on an agreed commission. The agreement
was to run for two months from date and thereafter until thirty
days' written notice of termination was given. The plaintiff contacted some prospective purchasers but never found a buyer, and
approximately a month after the date of the listing the defendant
himself sold the property at a lower price than that listed with the
plaintiff. The plaintiff brought this action for the commision provided in the listing. The trial court gave judgment for the commission.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in giving
plaintiff judgment for his commission, since he was entitled to
such a commission only in case he procured a purchaser at the
agreed price. The sale by the owner does not violate a contract of
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exclusive agency. Such a right to sell is an implied condition of
every agency contract and will prevail unless it is expressly negatived. The only effect of an exclusive agency contract is to forbid
the owner from placing the property in the hands of another agent.
The owner always has the right to sell the property himself without violating his obligation to the agent. Judgment was reversed
and cause remanded to enter judgment of dismissal.
(4) Gibbons and Reed Co. and Boyle Bros. Drilling Co. v.
Howard, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
This is a case involving "scope of employment" in the determination of liability in a tort action. Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Howard,
sued the defendant companies for personal injuries and property
damage resulting from a collision between plaintiffs' car and a
truck owned by the defendant companies.
The undisputed facts were that the truck was owned by the
defendant companies and it had been the custom of the companies
to permit certain responsible employees to use the truck for personal purposes. In the instant case, an employee obtained permission to use the companies' truck for the purpose of moving his
family and belongings from Loveland to Climax. During the moving trip, the accident occurred and the plaintiffs brought suit
against the defendant companies. The trial court entered judgment
for the plaintiffs and the defendant companies sued out a writ
of error.
The Supreme Court held that there is a distinction between
acts done "while in employment" and acts done "within the scope
of employment". In the instant case the only evidence of the
driver's acting within the scope of his employment was the practice
by the defendant companies in permitting their employees to make
occasional use of this particular truck for individual and personal
purposes. It was the burden of the plaintiffs to establish that acts
occurred within the scope of employment and there was no evidence
whatsoever to establish this. The use of the defendants' truck for
the employee's personal convenience did not expose the defendants
to liabilty. Case was reversed and cause remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
CONTRACTS

(1) Smith v. Whitlow, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 11.
Plaintiff, Whitlow, as assignee of a construction contract
brought suit against the defendant Smith for the balance due under
the contract. Smith defended on the ground that he had actually
signed the contract as president and agent of a corporation which
had become defunct prior to the bringing of the action. Smith asked
that the contract be reformed to substitute the corporation as the
real party in interest. There was no dispute as to the amount due.
Evidence showed that plaintiff's assignor had originally prepared the contract and that Smith had refused to sign it in its
original form and had taken it to his attorney for revision. A contract was finally signed in the attorney's.office but Smith was the
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only party mentioned and the corporation which he allegedly represented was never referred to in the contract.
The trial court entered final judgment in favor of the plaintiff
against the defendant Smith. Smith then filed motion for new trial
and upon its being denied took the case to the Supreme Court.
It was held that even if all of the evidence presented by Smith
in support of his contention that he signed the contract solely as
agent for the corporation were accepted as true, it would still constitute only a unilateral mistake and that a unilateral mistake does
not justify reformation of a contract. The Court further stated
that even in the case of the reformation of a contract on the grounds
of a mutual mistake the evidence must be clear, unequivocal and
undisputable. Judgment in favor of the original plaintiff was
affirmed.
(2) Whitechurch v. Dunlap, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
This is an action on a sales agreement for a used truck and
involves alleged representations made by the seller concerning the
running condition of the truck. There was also an issue as to a
payment to a finance company which was supposed to have been
made by the seller but had to be paid by the buyer before he obtained title to the truck.
The buyer was required to make substantial repairs to the
truck after he acquired it and the trial court entered judgment
for $689 in favor of plaintiff, said sum consisting of the unpaid
installment to the finance company plus a part of the repair bill.
In the Supreme Court it was held that there was no evidence to
justify the finding of fraudulent representations by the seller and
that in fact the evidence seemed to show that the buyer relied upon
his own judgment in accepting the truck rather than upon what
the seller told him. The judgment was reduced to the sum of
$124 which was the amount of the unpaid installment to the
finance company, and affirmed as to that amount.
(3) Carleno Coal Sales, Inc. v. Ramsay Coal Company, 195354 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
This case involves the right to terminate a contract for failure
of performance by one party. The plaintiff and the defendant had
entered into a written contract whereby the plaintiff was granted
the exclusive distribution for all coal produced by the defendant's
mines, excepting a reserved right to sell to certain railroad companies. The contract was entered into in 1944 and carried a term
of five years with a renewal option for an additional five years.
Three years after the contract date the defendant served a notice
of immediate termination which merely stated that the plaintiff
had failed and refused to execute the provisions of the agreement.
The written contract provided that the innocent party may give
sixty-day written notice of default and then terminate.
After serving the notice of immediate termination on the
plaintiff the defendant ceased to deliver coal to the plaintiff and
delivered the same to other purchasers. Plaintiff brought suit for
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damages. The trial court held that the termination by the defendant was effective and judgment was entered in favor of the
defendant.
On writ of error to the Supreme Court it was held that the
provision in the written contract for cancellation by sixty days'
notice was the only manner in which the contract could be terminated prior to the expiration of its original term. Defendant's contention was that the word "may" in the written contract in connection with the termination clause merely gave each party an
additional method of termination and that either party still had
the original right to immediate termination upon breach or failure
of performance.
The Court held, however, that the word "may" gave each party
the right to determine whether a breach was of sufficient consequence for such party to seek termination of the contract, but that
if termination was desired it must be accomplished in accordance
with the provisions of the written agreement. The judgment of
the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for determination of damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff.
(4) Mills v. Sharpe, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
This is a suit on the basis of quantum meruit for labor performed in the construction of four irrigation dams brought by plaintiff, Sharpe, against defendant, Mills. Evidence showed that initial negotiations for the dams had been between the plaintiff and
one Watkins but that dams were built on land owned by the defendant or leased and used by her. The dams were constructed
under the directions of the defendant who changed some plans for
the dams and on occasion halted the work on one of the dams. The
trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff in the amount prayed
for and the defendant appealed, the principal point of the appeal
being that the defendant was not a party to the contract, that there
was no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant, no
consideration and no mutuality of contract.
The Supreme Court held that if the plaintiff did the work for
the defendant's benefit and with her knowledge he is entitled to
recover reasonable compensation therefor. There being little question that the dams were constructed for the benefit of the defendant and that she had knowledge thereof, the judgment was
affirmed.
(5) Barday v. Steinbaugh, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
Suit on a promissory note. Defendants executed a promissory
note for $18,000.00 payable to the plaintiff in monthly installments
of $150 each, the first payment to become due July 1, 1951. The
note carried no interest but provided for default interest and also
contained an acceleration clause in the event of default.
There appeared to be no dispute as to the facts, which were
as follows: Defendant made payment of each installment through
December of 1951 and mailed a check for the January 1952 pay-
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ment, which check was received by the plaintiff and lost in the
mails when she sent the same for deposit. Defendants continued
making the monthly payments thereafter but did not make another
payment of the January 1952 installment although plaintiff requested the same on numerous occasions. In October 17, 1952,
plaintiff gave notice of her election to declare the full amount due
and payable, coupled with a demand for default interest, all based
on the January payment which had been lost. After delivery of
the notice the plaintiff accepted two more monthly installments and
then returned subsequent tendered installments. The trial court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground
that the acceptance of payments after the notice of acceleration
constituted a waiver of the acceleration right.
In the Supreme Court, the trial court was upheld, the Supreme
Court holding that the right to accelerate is an optional right in
the payee and may be waived. In the instant case waiver was made
complete by the acceptance of regular installment payments after
the acceleration notice had been given. Judgment was affirmed.
(6) Constitution Life Insurance Co. -v. Rogerson, 1953-54
C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 17.
This case involves the interpretation of certain rules of contracts with respect to a written application for a life insurance
policy and the life insurance policy subsequently issued on such
application. The plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Rogerson, made application for a $20,000 life insurance policy on each, the purpose being to obtain certain benefits in connection with estate taxes. Payment of the first year's premium accompanied the application for
each policy and the application contained the usual provision that
the application and policy issued thereon constituted the entire
agreement between the parties and that no outside statements or
parol agreement were of any force or effect. When the policies
were received by the plaintiffs they refused to accept the same and
sued for the amount of the premiums plus interest.
The basis of the plaintiffs' claim was that the policies were at
variance with the application in each case and therefore the policy
constituted a counter offer by the insurance company which the
plaintiffs could accept or reject. The first annual premium as
stated in the application for one policy was $1,767.60, whereas the
policy issued thereon called for an annual premium of $1,808.60, an
increase of $41.00. This was one of the grounds of the allegation
of variance, the others being that the application called for "commercial whole life" policies and that the statement of absolute
ownership in each policy was not called for by the respective applications. The trial court held that the policies issued by the company were at variance With the applications and rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs for the full amount of the premiums plus
interest.
The Supreme Court held that the change in the amount of
premium on the one policy constituted a variance from the applica-
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tion and therefore the policy was merely a counter offer which
could be rejected or accepted by the applicant. The change in policies from a "commercial whole life" to a "whole life" policy was
not considered a variance since no evidence was introduced to show
any difference between the two policies. The absolute ownership
clause in the policy was likewise construed not to be at variance
with the application, since the formal application in each case had
attached thereto a written statement providing for such absolute
ownership. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed as to the policy where increase in premium occurred and
was reversed with respect to the other policy.
(7) Pioneer Mutual Compensation Company v. Vernon
Casualty Insurance Company and Roxie Johns. 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv.
Sh. No. 18.
Suit by Johns against both insurance companies to recover
under collision policies in both companies on a certain tractor and
trailer which had been damaged. Johns owned two similar tractortrailer outfits. The one involved had been insured in the Vernon
Company first and when Johns applied for a policy on the second
trailer outfit with the Pioneer Company an error in description
was made so that the Pioneer policy covered the same outfit already
insured by the Vernon Company. The same agent handled both
policies. The Pioneer policy was delivered to the agent on January
10, 1952 at which time he noticed the mistake in the description of
the trailer outfit and notified the company immediately. The policy
however was delivered to Johns and the accident occurred eight
days later. After the accident an agent for Pioneer contacted
Johns and agreed to pay the entire loss, authorizing repairs to be
made on the trailer. Shortly thereafter the tractor-trailer was repaired and Johns disposed of it. After Pioneer agreed to the. settlement they cancelled the policy as of January 28, 1952 and Johns
paid the premium to that time. Pioneer then refused to pay the
loss. The trial court gave judgment to Johns against both insurance
companies and Pioneer appealed.
Pioneer's contention was that the policy involved covered the
tractor-trailer outfit by mistake and should be reformed to describe
the vehicle intended to be covered. It was held that since the Pioneer
Company had received and retained a premium for the period during which the accident occurred and since its agent had authorized
settlement under the policy, it had waived any right to reformation.
Judgment against the Pioneer Company was affirmed and judgment against the Vernon Company was reversed since no proof of
loss or other requirements of the Vernon Company policy had been
complied with by Johns.
CORPORATIONS

(1) Department of Employment Security v. General Cleaners
and Dyers. 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 2.
This case does not involve any corporation laws as such but
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concerns the state statutes on unemployement security. The General
Cleaners and Dyers as plaintiff in the trial court sought judgment
for a stipulated amount as refund of contributions paid under protest to the defendant, Department of Employment Security. Plaintiff was a corporation which had purchased a partnership business
and the issue was whether the corporation was entitled to continue
the contribution rate as determined by its predecessor, the partnership.
The Spreme Court held that the corporation was not entitled
to continue the partnership contribution rate since the statutory
requirements with respect to the predecessor in business owning
at least 50% of the interest in the successor business had not been
met. The judgment of the trial court awarding the refund claimed
was reversed.
(2) Arvey Corporation v. Fugate, Director of Revenue of
the State of Colorado. 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
This case involves an income tax assessment by the State of
Colorado against a foreign corporation. A subsidiary of the Arvey
corporation, an Illinois corporation, was engaged in the manufacture of insecticides in several states but had no plants in Colorado.
One Julius Hyman had invented the insecticides and was an officer
and director of the subsidiary corporation. Differences arose and
Hyman resigned and formed a new corporation with authority to
do business in Colorado. The Arvey corporation subsequently
brought an action in the Denver District Court to obtain an injunction against Hyman and his company to restrict them from manufacturing and selling certain insecticides and for damages from
the wrongful use of the Arvey company's trade secrets, etc. The
injunction was granted and a judgment in favor of the Arvey company for over a million dollars was entered.
This judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court and upon
its affirmance the Director of Revenue of the State of Colorado asserted his claim for income tax liability against the Illinois corporation. The trial court gave judgment in favor of the Director
of Revenue and the Arvey corporation assigned error. It was contended by the Arvey corporation that the judgment against Hyman
and Company was compensation for injuries and damages sustained by their wrongful acts and was an intangible having as its
situs the domicile of the Arvey corporation and therefore should
not be taxable by Colorado.
It was held however that there was no question concerning
the source of the income, that the judgment itself was based on
profits made by Hyman and Company in Colorado and that an adjudication had already been made that the judgment was for the
amount of the profits made by Hyman and Company. Since the real
question was the jurisdiction to tax, Colorado's right to levy an
income tax on this judgment was undeniable. The trial court's
judgment in favor of the Department of Revenue was affirmed.
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(3) Burleson v. Hayutin, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 17.
This is a case involving the appointment of a receiver for a
corporation. Plaintiff Burleson and one Vaughn were originally
partners and owners of the Curve Tavern. Two of the defendants
were attorneys for these partners and Vaughn subsequently sold
his interest to all of the defendants. A corporation was formed
and the assets of the partnership were transferred to the corporation, one-half of the stock being issued to the plaintiff Burleson
and the other one-half issued to the five defendants.
At the first meeting of the corporation Burleson was elected
president and made a director and actively managed the business,
receiving a salary of $250 a month. About a year later Burleson
was informed that his position as president and his salary were
terminated and that one of the defendants would be the new president. The directors authorized payments of salaries and a percentage of the profits to three of the defendants and thereafter
Burleson did not receive either salary or dividends from the corporation. Prior to the directors' meeting which ousted Burleson
he had given a proxy to vote his stock to one of the defendants,
the written proxy providing that it was irrevocable as long as the
two lawyer defendants owned any stock in the corporation. Burleson subsequently filed a suit in district court for an accounting, for
dissolution of the corporation and for receivership. The trial court
refused to appoint a receiver on the grounds that no mismanagement of the corporation business was alleged or shown and that no
emergency existed.
Burleson appealed under Rule 111 of the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court held that the circumstances
of this particular case were such that a receiver should have been
appointed. Two of the defendants were attorneys for the plaintiff
at the time they purchased the one-half interest in the business and
a very close and delicate relationship existed. When plaintiff, who
was the owner of one-half of the stock, received absolutely nothing
from the corporation after defendants assumed control the only
relief available to him was the appointment of a receiver and an
accounting. The order of the trial court denying the appointment
of a receiver was reversed.
PARTNERSHIPS

(1) Silvola v. Rowlett, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
This was an action by the plaintiff Silvola to recover judgment
for services rendered to the McRea Motor Company, the suit being against the defendant Rowlett, one of the partners. McRea
and Rowlett formed a limited partnership under the name of McRea
Motor Company and had filed a certificate of limited partnership
indicating that McRea was the general partner and Rowlett the
limited partner. Under the terms of the limited partnership Rowleft contributed certain personal property and cash and was to receive 9/24 of the profits of the partnership.
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McRea was the manager of the business and had contracted
for the employment of the plaintiff as an accountant to keep the
books and records of the partnership. Rowlett acted as foreman
in the partnership repair shop for a period of some six or eight
months, after which he discontinued his services as foreman and
another person was employed by McRea as foreman of the shop.
The partnership funds were all in one bank account under the sole
and exclusive control of McRea. He made all deposits and was the
only person authorized to draw checks on the company account.
Since McRea had been discharged in bankruptcy, suit was brought
against Rowlett and the trial court sustained Rowlett's claim that
he was a limited partner and entered judgment for the defendant.
In the Supreme Court the plaintiff contended that the assumption of duties as foreman of the partnership shop and the fact
that Rowlett at time discussed the partnership business with McRea removed him from the status of a limited partner and rendered him liable as a general partner. In affirming the trial court's
judgment, however, the Supreme Court held that the services rendered by the defendant did not deprive him of his protection as a
limited partner and that the partnership act does not impose a
silence on a limited partner to voice his opinion and suggestions
concerning the business.
(2) Kincaid v. Miller, 1953-54 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
Action in the trial court by the plaintiff Miller to recover onehalf of certain profits alleged to have been received and retained
by the defendant Kincaid from a joint venture of Miller and Kincaid in certain oil leases and properties. The trial court found in
favor of the plaintiff and defendant appealed to the Supreme Court
by way of writ of error.
The evidence disclosed that plaintiff and defendant jointly purchased certain oil leases, taking the leases in the name of a third
party. Certain leases and portions of leases were later sold and the
proceeds from the sale were divided equally between the parties.
Subsequently the defendant Kincaid repurchased various interests
which had been sold and then resold them at large profits, which
profits were retained entirely by the defendant. The defendant
admitted the original joint venture in the leases but claimed that
after such leases had once been sold or disposed of the joint venture
relationship terminated and his subsequent acquisition of the leases
was an individual venture in which the plaintiff had no interest and
should not share in the profits.
The testimony contained several admissions by the defendant
in support of plaintiff's claim of joint ownership and the Supreme
Court found that the joint ownership existed throughout the entire
transactions. It was held that in a joint venture one party cannot
exclude his co-owner from a rightful interest in joint property by
purchasing it himself and must account to his associate for any interest in the joint venture property which he acquires for his individual benefit. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

